/* Patents on living matter and software are a "brave new world." The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure's regulations on the patentability of these new types of inventions follows. */
2106.01 - Computer Programming and 35 U.S.C. 112, First Paragraph 2106.02 - Disclosure in Computer Programming Cases
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2105 Patentable Subject Matter-- Living Subject Matter [R-6]
The decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 206 USPQ 193 (1980) held that microorganisms produced by genetic engineering are not excluded from patent protection by 35 U.S.C. 101. It is clear from the Supreme Court decision and opinion that the question of whether or not an invention embraces living matter is irrelevant to the issue of patentability. The test set down by the Court for patentable subject matter in this area is whether the living matter is the result of human intervention.
In view of this decision the Office has issued these guidelines as to how 35 U.S.C. 101 will be interpreted.
The Supreme Court made the following points in the Chakrabarty opinion:
1. "Guided by these cannons of construction, this Court has read the term 'manufacture' in [35 U.S.C.] 101 in accordance with its dictionary definition to mean 'the production of articles for use from raw materials prepared by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations whether by hand labor or by machinery.'"
2. "In choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter', modified by the comprehensive 'any', Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."
3. "The Act embodied Jefferson's philosophy that 'ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement'. V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 75-76. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966). Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this same broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were recodified Congress replaced the word 'art' with 'process', but otherwise left Jefferson's language intact. The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include any thing under the sun that is made by man'. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., 5 (1952)"
4. "This is not to suggest that [35 U.S.C.] 101 has no
limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable."
5. "Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc^2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity."
6. "His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use'."
7. "Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's microorganism is the result of human ingenuity and research."
8. After reference to Funk Seed & Kalo Co., 333 U.S.127 (1948), "Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under [35 U.S.C.] 101."
A review of the Court statements above as well as the whole Chakrabarty opinion reveals:
(1) That the Court did not limit its decision to genetically engineered living organisms,
(2) The Court enunciated a very broad interpretation of manufacture and composition of matter in Section 35 U.S.C. 101 (Note esp. quotes 1, 2, and 3 above),
(3) The Court set forth several tests for weighing whether patentable subject matter under Section 35 U.S.C. 101 is present stating (in Quote 7 above) that:
"The relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions."
The tests set forth by the court are (note especially the italicized portions [designated herein thusly *italic portions*]):
-The laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.
-A nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter a product of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character, [and] use. is patentable subject matter.
-A new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated E=mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 'manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'
-However, the production of articles for use from raw materials prepared by giving to these materials *new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations whether by hand, labor or machinery* (emphasis added) is a manufacture under Section 35 U.S.C. 101. In analyzing the history of the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the Court stated: In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both of these concerns [the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law . . . were thought not amenable to the written description]. It explained at length its belief that the work of the plant breeder 'in aid of nature' was patentable invention. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong. 2d Sess. 6-8 (1930); H.R. Rep. No. 1129. 71st Cong. 2d Sess. 7-9 (1930).
The Office will decide the questions as to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 on a case-by-case basis following the tests set forth in Chakrabarty, e.g., that a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter is patentable, etc. It is inappropriate to try to attempt to set forth here in advance the exact parameters to be followed.
The standard of patentability has not and will not be lowered. The requirements of 35 U.S.C. 102 and 35 U.S.C. 103 still apply. The tests outlined above simply mean that a rational basis will be present for any 35 U.S.C.101 determination. In addition, the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112 must also be met. In this regard, see MPEP 608.01(p).
Following this analysis by the Supreme Court of the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has determined that plant subject matter or an animal may be protected under 35 U.S.C. 101. In Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd PAI 1985) the Board held that plant subject matter may be the proper subject of a patent under 35 U.S.C. 101 even though such subject matter may be protected under the Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C. 161 to 35 U.S.C. 164) or the Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 2321 et seq.). In Ex Parte Allen, 2 USPQ2d 1425 (Bd PAI 1987), the Board decided that a polyploid Pacific coast oyster could have been the proper subject of a patent under 35 U.S.C. 101 if all the criteria for patentability were satisfied. Shortly after the Allen decision, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks issued a notice (Animals - Patentability, 1077 O.G. 24, April 21, 1987) that the Patent and Trademark Office would now consider non-naturally occurring, non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101.
2106 Patentable Subject Matter--Mathematical Algorithms or Computer Programs [R-6]
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) and Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381, 209 USPQ 97 (1981) significantly affect an examiner's analysis under 35 U.S.C. 101 of patent applications involving mathematical e
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